This paper studies the effect of term length on the behavior of legislators using field experiments in the Arkansas, Illinois and Texas Senates. After reapportionment, state senators are randomly assigned to serve either two-year or four-year terms, providing a rare opportunity to study legislative behavior experimentally. The evidence shows that in those states where candidates are allowed to spend and raise continuously throughout their terms, senators serving shorter terms raise and spend more money than senators serving longer terms, but only when the election is imminent. In some cases, senators serving shorter terms abstain more often, while in others they introduce fewer bills. Shorter terms do not result in increased responsiveness according to the rank-based measures analyzed. The results offer a different perspective on the classic view that shorter terms are unambiguously beneficial for constituents.
When designing the American Constitution, a central concern of the Founding Fathers was to create representative institutions that would lead representatives to act in the best interest of the people. Regular elections were seen as an essential step towards achieving this goal (Federalist 52), but deciding the frequency of elections gave rise to controversy. On the one hand, the Founding Fathers believed that short appointments would result in greater dependence on the people (Federalist 57, 63, 71) and would protect them from the possible degeneracy of their leaders (Federalist 52) . But the Framers also noticed the risks associated with exceedingly short terms. They feared that short terms would result in undesirable outcomes because representatives might avoid pursuing unpopular but necessary policies (Federalist 63, 71) , might fail to engage in policies with long-term benefits (Federalist 63, 71) , and might lack the time to acquire enough expertise and information (Federalist 64, 53) . The tenure by which representatives were to hold their offices was thus carefully designed to serve these two conflicting purposes at once, and the adoption of different term lengths in the two houses of the U.S. Congress reflected, in part, a compromise between these opposing forces.
These concerns continue to be relevant today, perhaps with the additional consideration that campaigning might be another constrain imposed by exceedingly short terms. This paper attempts to provide empirical evidence on whether one of these principles dominates the other in the state legislative arena. Do legislators exert higher effort when their terms are shorter because they fear voters are watching their performance more closely when elections are near? Or is this offset by the lack of time and incentives to invest in long-term policies that may be associated with short terms? Do shorter terms lead to more "representative" legislators? As evidenced by previous work on the U.S. Senate, answering these questions empirically poses important methodological challenges, since in order to learn whether legislative behavior is affected by the duration of terms, one would need to know how legislators would have behaved if their term length had been shorter or longer. This is of course extremely difficult, since this counterfactual behavior is never observed. I overcome this problem by taking advantage of a series of randomized field experiments that take place in the State Senates of Arkansas, Illinois and Texas. In these states, state senators normally serve for a period of four years and are staggered so that one half (Arkansas and Texas) or one third (Illinois) of senate seats are up for election every two years. But in the election following reapportionment, all senate seats are up for election to ensure that senators are representative of their new constituencies. The staggered structure of terms is thus broken, and it is reestablished via random assignment.
The experiments considered here are unusual in that its subjects are elected representatives and not private citizens, providing a rare opportunity to study legislative behavior experimentally. It is of course a well-known fact that experiments, if implemented correctly, provide a valid counterfactual group and give researchers the possibility of identifying causal parameters. But a secondary and much less frequently exploited advantage of experiments is that they provide an exact way of testing hypotheses about the parameters of interest that relies solely on the assumption that the randomization procedure is known and was correctly implemented, not on statistical models or large sample theory. This is the Fisherian approach, in which randomization is the "physical basis" of the validity of the test of no treatment effect (Fisher 1935 ). This approach is taken here, where all statistical inferences are based solely on the randomization distribution of term lengths in each state.
Operationalizing notions such as representativeness or effort is not an easy task, both for conceptual and data availability reasons. I follow previous literature as much as possible in selecting the outcomes of interest. To measure legislative productivity I consider abstention rates (Thomas 1991) and bill introduction (Schiller 1995) . To measure whether senators become "closer" to their constituents I consider different measures of responsiveness (e.g., Bernstein 1991; Kuklinski 1978) . Finally, to measure the extent of campaigning I consider campaign expenditures and contributions.
The results vary by state and year, but there seems to be a consistent pattern. Although in some state-years term length appears to have no significant effect on the outcomes considered, every time an effect is statistically significant it shows that shorter terms decrease legislative output. The results also show, perhaps surprisingly, that the pattern of campaign expenditures and contributions is considerably less cyclical than common wisdom would have it. The interpretation of these results should be done with caution. At one level, they show no support for the hypothesis that shorter terms increase responsiveness and legislative output in the State Senates considered. Neither do they suggest that shorter terms impose big burdens in terms of fundraising. In this sense, there is no support for the idea that shorter terms are unambiguously beneficial for constituents, as suggested in the classical arguments of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) . On the other hand, interpreting the results as conclusive evidence on the positive effects of longer terms seems too strong a conclusion, since some state-years show no significant difference. More evidence is needed. It is promising, however, that these results are consistent with a recent contribution by Dal Bo and Rossi (2008) that studies the effect of term length on legislative behavior in Argentina, where term lengths were randomly assigned among groups of legislators. Despite studying a different country and time period, the authors find that various measures of legislative output for Argentine senators are higher when terms are longer.
I begin by introducing the methodological problem faced by previous empirical studies of the effect of election proximity on legislative behavior, and discuss how the experiment in this paper provides a solution to this problem. I then describe the institutional details surrounding the random assignment of term lengths in the Arkansas, Illinois and Texas Senates, and discuss the randomization inference model, on which all statistical inferences are based. Finally, I present and discuss the main empirical findings.
The methodological problem and a solution
Previous scholars of American politics have analyzed the effect of term length on legislative behavior using observational studies, mainly using designs in which the proximity of elections was different over time and/or across legislators (e.g. Amacher and Boyes 1978; Ahuja 1994; Bernhard and Sala 2006; Bernstein 1988 Bernstein , 1991 Glazer and Robbins 1985; Elling 1982; Jackson 1974; Levitt 1996; Thomas 1985 Thomas , 1991 Wood and Andersson 1998; Wright and Berkman 1986) . With the exception of Kuklinski (1978) , this literature has focused on the U.S. Senate, and it has done so almost exclusively for methodological reasons.
Two reasons were cited to justify this choice. First, the longer terms served by senators as compared to House members were expected to make cyclical patterns of behavior more likely to appear (Ahuja 1994; Bernstein 1991; Elling 1982) . Second, and more importantly, the staggered structure of the U.S. Senate led to senators with different time horizons to serve in the same Congress (Amacher and Boyes 1978; Thomas 1991; Wright and Berkman 1986) . Scholars saw these two features as providing an ideal "natural experiment", since it allowed for the analysis of both the behavior of a given senator at different points in his term and the behavior of different senators with different time horizons at the same point in time.
Some early authors, however, recognized that these strategies were not without limitations.
After studying the change in U.S. senators' behavior between the first and last year of their terms for several classes originally elected in different years, Elling (1982) noted:
It might be objected that the shifting of each class is simply a result of more general forces that affected all senators whether or not they were up for reelection. This possibility cannot be completely dismissed since it is impossible to come up with what is, strictly speaking, a control group. Ideally what is required is a group of senators serving coterminously with senators in a particular class but who do not need to stand for reelection. (Elling, 1982) .
What Elling recognized was effectively a missing data problem: the ideal control group with which one would want to compare a given group of senators is just unavailable given the characteristics of the design. This lack of a valid control group can limit the conclusions about term length effects that can be drawn from studies of the U.S. Senate. If one exploits the staggered structure of the senate and uses senators in one class as counterfactuals for senators in another, the most obvious limitation is that senators in different classes are elected at different elections 1 , and as a consequence may be subject to different political forces. For example, senators elected during a large partisan tide that benefits their party in an on-year election will campaign on a platform that will likely be considerably different from the platform of senators from the same party who are elected during an off-year election when their party suffers important losses. In general, the political problem facing senators in different classes will be different in ways that may seriously bias statistical inferences.
On the other hand, if one exploits the length of senators' terms and uses as counterfactual their behavior at a previous point in time, the limitation is that events such as economic crises, natural disasters, political scandals, drastic changes in political agendas, etc., can occur during a senator's term and prompt changes in behavior. These changes will not be caused by the proximity of elections but will be unavoidably correlated with the remaining time in office, once again potentially biasing statistical inferences.
This paper avoids these methodological problems using a series of experiments that occur in the State Senates of Arkansas, Illinois and Texas, where the length of terms is randomly assigned in the elections immediately after reapportionment. As explained in detail below, in these states all senate seats are up for election after redistricting, and senators are randomly assigned to serve either two-year terms or four-year terms after each reapportionment. Under the assumption of a correctly implemented randomization procedure, senators assigned a four-year term are a valid counterfactual for senators assigned a two-year term. The research design employed in this paper compares both types of senators in the two years following an election where terms are randomized in order to provide a valid estimate of the effect of term length on legislative behavior.
Although the random assignment of term lengths has desirable methodological features, focusing on these state-level experiments imposes the constraint that term length and proximity of elections cannot be distinguished. In the observational design that analyzes staggered 1 In the U.S. Senate, it is always the case that senators in different classes are elected at different elections. As discussed below, this is not the case in the experiments analyzed here, where the fact that senators are elected at the same time to serve terms of different length (and, as a consequence, to face reelection at different times) is precisely what gives rise to the experiment.
classes elected for terms of the same length, proximity of elections varies, while term length is constant. In contrast, in the experiments analyzed here, senators are elected at the same time to serve terms of different length, so that proximity of elections and term length vary simultaneously. It follows that this design is not suited to separate the effects of election proximity from the effects of term length. Although real, this constraint is not limiting for the study of term length effects because in such a study term length and election proximity should not be conceptually separated. When effects of term length on legislative behavior are hypothesized, it is precisely because different term lengths imply permanent changes in the temporal proximity of reelection.
Randomization in state senates
This research design is made possible by a rule in Arkansas, Texas and Illinois that randomly assigns term lengths after each reapportionment. In all states in the U.S., State Senate districts are redrawn following each federal census to ensure that the total state population is distributed approximately equally between districts. In a minority of states, the Constitution mandates that in the election immediately after reapportionment all Senate seats must be up for election. The purpose of this provision is to allow all Senate districts to choose a new representative in the first election under the new district plan, to ensure that the new constituencies are appropriately represented. In the cases where senators' terms are staggered, this post-reapportionment provision brakes the staggered structure. In Arkansas, Illinois and Texas, the procedure used to recover the staggered structure of the terms is random assignment.
This section presents the details of the assignment process in these three states. The empirical analysis presented below includes the legislative sessions that followed the assignment of terms during the 2000 reapportionment for the three states, and the legislative sessions that followed the assignment of terms during two reapportionments in the 1990s for Texas.
These legislative sessions where chosen on the basis of data availability.
Arkansas
The Arkansas Senate has 35 members serving four-year terms. In all general elections that do not occur immediately after a redistricting plan has been implemented, half of the senate seats are up for election. Senators are therefore staggered, with half of them running for election every two years. When all senate seats are up for election, the staggered structure of senators' terms is broken; the way in which it is restored is the random assignment of term State senators generally serve four-years, and they are staggered so that every two years a third of the senate seats is up for election. Once again, after each reapportionment all senate seats are up for election to ensure that the new electorate in each district is adequately represented, and the staggered structure is broken. Illinois Constitution, Article IV, §2(a), mandates that after each reapportionment senate districts be divided into three classes according to their term structure in the following ten years: class I serves 4 years, 4 years and 2 years; class II serves 4 years, 2 years and 4 years; and class III serves 2 years, 4 years and 4 years. Article 29c in Illinois Election Code requires that senators be assigned to classes randomly.
The random assignment mechanism is different from that of Arkansas and Texas, since it is stratified by groups, which are predetermined. Districts are divided into three groups, and after each reapportionment, each group is randomly assigned to exactly one of the classes mentioned above.
3 Thus, the assignment of term lengths is done at the group level and not at the senate district level. The current division of districts into groups was established by law in 1992, respecting Article IV, §2, of the Illinois Constitution, which mandates that districts in each group "shall be distributed substantially equally over the State." As a consequence, the current groups are not geographically clustered, and all of them contain districts throughout the state.
The analysis includes senators serving in Illinois 93rd General Assembly, which met between January of 2003 and December of 2004. The random assignment of district groups to different classes was done after redistricting but before the election, so that, unlike in Arkansas and Texas, senators knew whether they would be serving a 2-year term or a 4-year term before the election.
Randomization inference
This random assignment of senatorial terms in Arkansas, Texas and Illinois provides a unique opportunity not only from the point of view of research design but also from the point of view of estimation. Instead of relying on large sample approximations (particularly important in this case given the relatively small sample sizes) and parametric assumptions, all statistical inferences are based on the randomization process itself. The randomization model was first proposed by Fisher (1935) istics of the randomization model are that treatment is randomly assigned among subjects, the randomization procedure is known, and subjects are fixed in the sense that they are not assumed to be a random sample from a population (Lehmann 1998) , all of which are met by the randomization of term lengths in Arkansas, Illinois and Texas.
The most attractive methodological feature of a randomization model is that the hy-68; the second group includes districts 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 44, 47, 50, 53, 56, and 59 ; and the third group includes districts 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27, 30, 33, 36, 39, 42, 45, 48, 51, 54, 57. pothesis of no treatment effect can be tested with no assumptions of any kind (Rosenbaum 2002b) . Let Y be an N -dimensional vector which contains the responses for the N subjects to whom a binary treatment is randomly assigned, let T be the N -dimensional vector of treatment assignments, and let N t be the number of treated subjects and N c = N − N t the number of control subjects. When the randomization procedure is known, one can define the set Ω of all possible values of the vector T in which the number of treated subjects is fixed to be N t (and the number of controls is fixed to be N c ). In the case of completely randomized experiments of the sort considered here, the number of elements in the set Ω is all possible values of the vector T in which there are N t ones and N − N t zeros. Thus, the cardinality of Ω is N Nt and each of these possible assignments has an equal probability of occurring, given by
To test the hypothesis that the treatment is without effect, a test-statistic W (T, Y) is defined which depends on the treatment assignment T and outcomes Y. Thus, under the null hypothesis of no treatment effect the only random variable is the treatment assignment, and the distribution of W (T, Y) is completely determined by the randomization distribution of T. The notation W (T, y) is used to emphasize that under the null hypothesis the potential outcomes are not a random variable, and can be considered to be assigned to treatment or control together with the subjects.
Under the null hypothesis of no treatment effect, the test-statistic W (T, y) takes a particular value for each of the N Nt possible treatment assignments, which means that its null distribution is known exactly. The (one-sided) significance level is the proportion of all treatment assignments for which the calculated value of the test statistic exceeds its realized value W (t, y). If N were sufficiently small, this significance level could be calculated exactly.
In the experiments considered in this paper, however, exact calculation is not possible because there are A crucial feature of randomization inference is that one can derive the randomization distribution of any test statistic W (T, y). Thus, the hypothesis of no treatment effect can be tested using different test-statistics to ensure that inferences are not driven by the particular choice of W (T, y). The analysis in this paper is based on three different teststatistics: the difference in means, the difference in medians, and the Wilcoxon rank-sum statistic. These test-statistics are respectively defined as follows:
where y is the rank function, and F t and F c are the empirical cumulative distribution functions of the treated and control outcomes, respectively.
While the analysis of the experiments in Arkansas and Texas fits this framework directly, the analysis for Illinois requires an additional assumption since, as mentioned in the previous section, terms are assigned at the level of groups, not senate districts. Ideally, all inferences in this state would be carried out at the group level, because the same treatment status is simultaneously assigned to all districts in each group. Unfortunately, the total number of groups is only 3, which means that the significance level p is at most 1/3 and there is not enough statistical power to reject the null hypothesis. Inferences for Illinois can be made at the level of senate district under the assumption that groups are randomly assigned among districts. Although in practice districts were not randomly assigned to groups, they were divided into arbitrary groups according to a principle of equal distribution over the state.
The inferences for Illinois presented below make the assumption that this procedure for dividing districts into groups gave each district an equal probability of being assigned to any of the three groups.
Results
Data were collected from a variety of sources. Census data were obtained from the U.S. Testing the randomization I tested the randomization in two steps. First, I checked that the random assignment of term lengths was implemented as described in the states' constitutions and election codes. In personal communications with staff members of the Arkansas, Illinois and Texas Senates, I
inquired about the implementation of the randomization and was assured that no exceptions were made. I also learned about the random mechanism used in each case, which in all cases ensured that each treatment assignment was equally likely.
Second, I tested covariate balance. The random assignment of treatment implies that the distributions of all variables not affected by treatment (including baseline covariates)
are identical between treatment and control groups. However, in a given sample, the empirical distribution of baseline covariates may be significantly different between both groups.
Since covariate imbalance may lead to biased inferences, testing whether randomization produced similar empirical distributions across groups is crucial. Equally important, covariate balance gives more confidence in validity of the experiment, since deviations from a clean random assignment of terms would likely result in significant differences across observable characteristics.
Figures 2 through 6 show the results of balance tests for all the senate sessions analyzed.
All hypothesis tests were conducted using the randomization inference procedure described For every outcome considered in every senate session, the tables show the mean for senators serving 2-year terms and 4-year terms, respectively, the p-value corresponding to the hypothesis test that the means are equal between both groups, the median for senators serving 2-year terms and 4-year terms, respectively, the p-value corresponding to the hypothesis test that the medians are equal, and the p-value corresponding to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. All p-values and test-statistics are calculated as described in the previous section. The results are presented separately by state and session.
In the results presented below (and also in the balance tests reported above), a natural concern is that the small sample sizes will not provide enough statistical power to reject the null hypothesis that term length is without effect. Although this possibility cannot be 5 To deal with this problem, I calculate for each state senate district the share of its total voting age population (or vote totals when available) that is coming from each state house district that is partially or completely contained in it, and use those shares to weight the DW-Nominate scores of state house members.
6 Two additional measures for ranking districts were developed and tested. The first ranks districts according to the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote in the most recent presidential election, and the district with the highest Democratic share is ranked as the most liberal. The second ranks districts according to the method proposed by Kernell (2009) , which uses multiple statewide election returns to estimate voters' ideological distributions within districts under the assumption of normality. Results using these two additional measures are consistent with the results reported in Tables 1, 3 and 5. 7 The rank-sum test was not performed for these measures to avoid nesting ranks.
completely ruled out, the results below show that statistical significance is achieved in many cases, which implies that in these samples statistical significance can be achieved. This is reassuring, since it suggests (but it does not prove) that insignificant results are more likely to stem from a true lack of effect than from a lack of power.
Arkansas
The results for Arkansas 2003 Senate Session are presented in Table 1 The first row of Table 1 shows the differences in abstention rates. The results shows that a shorter term length has no effect on abstention rates: the mean abstention rate is 3.1% for 2-year senators and 3.7% for 4-year senators (p-value 0.598). The p-values for the median and the rank-sum statistic give further evidence that the distribution of abstention rates is not affected by term length. But the situation is different when it comes to the number of bills introduced during the legislative session, shown in the second and third rows of Table   1 . Senators serving two years introduce a significantly lower number of bills than senators serving four years, and this is not compensated by passing disproportionately more bills introduced by 2-year senators. The mean number of bills introduced by 4-year senators is 30.7, about 50% higher than the average 20.6 bills introduced by 2-year senators, a difference highly significant (p-value 0.007). The median number of bills is also about 50% higher for 4-year senators, and the rank-sum test is also highly significant (p-value 0.004). Finally, rows four through six in Table 1 present responsiveness measures. Neither of these measures is affected by term length.
Illinois
Results for Illinois are reported in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 As shown in the first three rows of Table 3 , there is no significant difference in either abstention rates or bill introduction and passage between 2-year senators and 4-year senators.
The mean and median point estimates for abstention rates, are remarkably similar between both groups, with extremely high p-values. There is not statistically significant difference in the number of bills passed or the share of senators' own bills that are passed.
The responsiveness of senators as measured by Sen rk-Rep rk, in the last row of seems to be somewhat lower for 2-year senators according to the median and rank-sum test, although this difference is not statistically significant for the means.
Texas
The effects of term length on campaign finance for Texas are reported in Table 4 The results for the 78th Legislature are reported in the bottom panel of Table 4 . As do borrow, spend and receive significantly more money when their terms are shorter, but most of these differences occur when the election is imminent, not throughout their terms. Table 5 presents the Texas results for abstention rates, bill introduction and responsiveness. As mentioned above, in 1993 the assignment of terms occurred in the middle of the Legislative Session, providing a placebo test. The sample is divided in two, according to whether voting occurred before or after randomization. As shown in the first row of Table 5, while before randomization there is no significant difference between the groups which will be later assigned to different term lengths, after the assignment senators whose reelection is two years away present a significantly higher abstention rate. In the post-treatment period in 1993, the mean abstention rate for 2-year senators is 4.5%, while the mean abstention rate for 4-year senators is 2.7%, a large and highly significant difference (p-value 0.007).
In contrast, in the pre-treatment period mean abstention rates are, respectively, 2.1% and 2.6% (p-value 0.632). These findings give confidence in the validity of the experiment, since no differences in abstention rates (or any other outcome) should be seen before terms are assigned.
In 1995, the abstention rate results are not statistically significant for any of the statistics reported, although the point estimates are remarkably similar to the 1993 post-treatment effects. In 2003, the results show again that senators whose reelection is closer have significantly higher abstention rates, with 2-year senators abstaining 2.9% on average, more than twice the average abstention rate among 4-year senators. Results from median and rank-sum statistics are consistent with mean results in all cases.
The middle panel of Table 5 shows the results for bill introduction. In 1993 and 1995, senators serving two years introduce the same number of bills as senators serving four years. The results in the bottom panel of Table 5 show that in 1993 and 1995, term length had no effect on the responsiveness of state senators to their constituents as measured by
Sen rk-Vt rk and Sen rk-Rep rk. The results for 2003 show that the estimated distance between senators' ranks and districts' ranks is smaller in the 2-year group, although not all tests reach statistical significance. 10 However, given the difficulties involved in measuring responsiveness, these results must be interpreted cautiously.
10 The two additional measures mentioned in footnote 7 also yield statistically significant results at 5% or 10% level. Although all statistically significant results show that shorter terms decrease legislative output, these negative effects appear in some state and some years, but not in all of them. This is not enough evidence to conclude that shorter terms are always undesirable. But the evidence is stronger if seen from the opposite perspective: in no state or year do the results show that short terms increase legislative output, and with only one possible exception there is no evidence that shorter terms increase responsiveness. These results, together with those in Dal Bo and Rossi (2008) , bring a new perspective on the classic results by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) according to which shorter terms always lead, everything else equal, to an advancement of constituency interests. Future research is needed to yield light on the precise mechanisms at work, which are likely to combine a number of phenomena brought about by longer terms, including greater incentives to invest in long-term policies, more available time for legislating given less campaign-related requirements, and a sense of protection against immediate electoral punishment from taking controversial or unpopular positions. Note: Total sample size is 52, 17 senators in the 2-year group and 35 senators in the 4-year group. Column 2yr corresponds to senators serving two-year terms, and column 4yr corresponds to senators serving fouryear terms. Column P-val is the randomization inference p-value corresponding to the hypothesis test that term length is without effect, calculated as described in the text. Total sample size is 52, 17 senators in the 2-year group and 35 senators in the 4-year group. Column 2yr corresponds to senators serving two-year terms, and column 4yr corresponds to senators serving fouryear terms. Column P-val is the randomization inference p-value corresponding to the hypothesis test that term length is without effect, calculated as described in the text. Note: Total sample size is 31, 15 senators in the 2-year group and 16 senators in the 4-year group. Column 2yr corresponds to senators serving two-year terms, and column 4yr corresponds to senators serving fouryear terms. Column P-val is the randomization inference p-value corresponding to the hypothesis test that term length is without effect, calculated as described in the text. Rows 1995 Rows -1, 1996 Rows -1, 2002 Rows -1, 2003 Rows -1, and 2004 refer to the first half of year 1995 , 1996 , 2002 , 2003 and 2004 , respectively. Rows 1995 -2, 1996 -2, 2002 -2, 2003 -2, and 2004 refer to the second half of year 1995, 1996, 2002, 2003 and 2004, respectively. Column 2yr corresponds to senators serving two-year terms, and column 4yr corresponds to senators serving fouryear terms. Column P-val is the randomization inference p-value corresponding to the hypothesis test that term length is without effect, calculated as described in the text.
